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NO. 4 JANUARY 2019 Introduction 
The End of the INF Treaty is Looming 
A New Nuclear Arms Race Can Still Be Prevented 
Wolfgang Richter 
President Trump wants to terminate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty signed in 1987. Its aim was to end the nuclear deployment race between the US 
and the then Soviet Union in Europe. Trump justified his intention by accusing Russia 
of violating the Treaty. Moscow denies this and also accuses Washington of being in 
breach of the Treaty. Trump has argued that China’s INF potential is also jeopardising 
the US’s strategic position. However, this unilateral move by Washington contradicts 
NATO’s recent positions. If the US were to withdraw from the INF Treaty, another 
cornerstone of the European security order and the global nuclear order would col-
lapse. Unpredictability and destabilisation would increase. Europe must resolutely 
oppose the threat of a new nuclear arms race. It should insist on verifying the accu-
sations from both sides under transparent and cooperative conditions and, if neces-
sary, agree on additional stabilisation measures in order to preserve the Treaty or 
limit the consequences of a US withdrawal. 
 
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty obliges the US and the former Soviet 
Union to destroy ground-launched cruise 
missiles (GLCMs) with a range of between 
500 and 5,500 km, as well as their launch-
ers and infrastructure. It prohibits their 
reintroduction, manufacture, flight-testing 
and depot storage. 
The INF Treaty ended the “missile crisis” 
between Moscow and Washington that 
lasted from 1978 to 1985. Germany and 
other Western European countries had 
feared that the USSR might blackmail 
Europe with a massive deployment of SS-20 
medium-range missiles because the nuclear 
balance discouraged the US from strategic 
escalation. As a result, in 1979, NATO de-
cided by consensus to station 572 medium-
range missiles in Western Europe and to 
seek dialogue with the USSR. This addition-
al deployment led to mass protests, espe-
cially in Germany. 
The INF Treaty entered into force in 
1988. By May 1991, 846 US and 1,846 Soviet 
INF systems had been completely destroyed. 
Since it eliminated a whole category of 
nuclear weapons, the Treaty is considered 
an important turning point on the path 
to ending the Cold War and a key element 
of European security architecture. 
On 20 October 2018, President Trump 
announced during an election campaign 
appearance that the US would withdraw 
from the INF Treaty because Russia had 
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been violating it for four years. Also China’s 
INF arsenal had contributed to the US’s 
strategic disadvantage, although it is not a 
contracting party. A future trilateral agree-
ment should, therefore, also include China. 
As long as this is not achieved, the US would 
increase deployment to force a solution. 
Trump put the decision in the context 
of a political power struggle between the 
US, Russia and China. He is of the view that 
Moscow wants to expand its global position 
at the expense of the US. However, he did not 
mention the strategic situation in Europe 
or a concrete threat to alliance partners. 
Allegations of breaching 
the Treaty 
Since 2014, the US has been publicly accus-
ing Russia of having tested and deployed 
Iskander 9M729 (known as SSC-8 in NATO 
vernacular), ground launched cruise mis-
siles (GLCMs) with a maximum range of 
2,600 km. The SSC-8s are supposed to have 
been deployed on mobile launchers in two 
missile units, namely in Yekaterinburg 
(Sverdlovsk region), east of the Ural Moun-
tains and at the Kapustin Jar test site near 
the Caspian Sea. The US accuses Russia of 
having developed these GLCMs since 2008. 
After much hesitation, Moscow conceded 
the existence of the new system, but denies 
its alleged range and rejects the allegation 
it was in breach of the Treaty. The US has 
not submitted any evidence. Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, 
said that Russia complies with the INF 
Treaty. According to Ryabkov, the US wants 
to force Russia to make new concessions. 
Moscow also accuses the US of violating 
the INF Treaty, suggesting the US had de-
ployed medium-range ballistic missiles to 
test its missile defence system. Further-
more, the technical features of US long-
range drones matched those of banned 
GLCMs. 
In particular, the US had deployed Mk-41 
launchers on land in Deveselu, Romania 
(Aegis Ashore), which are also used on US 
ships for vertically launched cruise missiles 
(SLCM Tomahawk), and planned to deploy 
them in Poland. From there, the US would 
be able to launch GLCMs against targets in 
Russia. This option is also explicitly men-
tioned in the US Nuclear Posture Review 
from February 2018. 
Washington rejects Russia’s accusations, 
stating that a combat drone is not a cruise 
missile because it can return to its starting 
point. It also said that the missiles used for 
missile defence tests were not banned by 
the INF Treaty. Due to their modified soft-
ware and cabling, the Aegis Ashore systems 
are only suitable for launching defence 
missiles. Furthermore, the bilateral deploy-
ment agreement with Romania is a legally 
binding agreement that the systems should 
only be used for missile defence. 
Verification gap 
The accusations from both sides differ in 
the extent to which they can be reliably 
checked. The Russian allegations against 
the US concern questions of Treaty inter-
pretation; the underlying facts as such are 
undisputed. In turn, the US accuses Russia 
of secretly breaching the Treaty. However, 
it is difficult to assess the factual basis of 
these allegations because the US only selec-
tively communicates the sources of its 
findings. Nor do the allies’ expressions of 
solidarity suggest that they have any sig-
nificant findings of their own. 
If the allies had information they had 
acquired by technical means – such as sat-
ellite imagery or communications surveil-
lance – they could make a substantial con-
tribution to clarifying the situation. There 
is no doubt that espionage findings from 
human sources should also be taken seri-
ously, but they do not provide definitive 
certainty. For example, former US Secretary 
of State, Colin Powell, justified the decision 
to launch the Iraq War in the United 
Nations Security Council in 2003 with false 
information attributed to an unreliable 
human source. 
On the other hand, Russia has so far 
done little to dispel suspicion of them 
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having breached the Treaty. The accusa-
tions could best be investigated by means of 
cooperative verification, which has proved 
effective in arms control for many years now. 
The INF verification regime provides for 
mutual on-site inspections to verify that the 
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles listed 
in the Treaty, as well as their launchers 
and infrastructure, have been destroyed as 
agreed. Cameras on factory gates were used 
to monitor whether production had stopped. 
Former launch facilities in Germany were 
also regularly checked. The regime ended in 
May 2001. 
The Special Verification Commission (SVC) 
aims to clarify issues of Treaty implementa-
tion through dialogue. Since the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, members of the Con-
sultation Forum have also included the 
post-Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. 
However, the INF Treaty does not contain 
any mechanisms to prove whether one party 
is circumventing Treaty rules, such as in-
spections of undeclared facilities announced 
at short notice. In order to enable this, the 
US and Russia would have to agree bilater-
ally or at the SVC to modify and reintro-
duce the INF verification regime. 
Verification options 
First of all, data and facts would have to be 
exchanged at the SVC in order to substan-
tiate the allegations and to clarify technical 
issues. In fact, the SVC met in 2017, but 
neither there nor in bilateral dialogue 
was it possible to reach agreement on the 
matter. The US complains that Russia has 
not demonstrated the transparency re-
quired to constructively address the alle-
gations. 
A bilateral expert meeting, which had 
been arranged at the SVC in December 
2017, does not appear to have taken place 
yet. At the meeting, experts would have 
discussed the allegations from both sides in 
detail. It would have been a chance to see 
how serious the Russian national security 
advisor, Nikolai Patrushev, was when he 
said Russia wanted to contribute transpar-
ently to clarifying the situation. He had 
expressed this sentiment in talks with US 
security advisor, John Bolton, in Moscow on 
22 October 2018, who explained President 
Trump’s intention to withdraw from the 
Treaty. 
The opportunities for a cooperative 
solution to the dispute are, therefore, by 
no means exhausted. A meeting of experts 
could be used to discuss whether differ-
ences in the interpretation of technical 
provisions could be eliminated with the 
help of clarifying protocols. An agreement 
on data exchange and mutual verification 
would be essential. It should include satel-
lite and aerial observations as well as on-
site inspections. 
The introduction of a prohibited INF 
system into field formations would not only 
require blueprints, but also a larger number 
of missiles, carrier vehicles, launchers and 
associated infrastructure. This would in-
clude accommodation, warehouses, park-
ing, supply and repair facilities as well as 
training areas. The existence of such mili-
tary equipment and infrastructure can be 
determined through national satellite re-
connaissance and cooperative observation 
flights conducted under the Treaty on Open 
Skies (OS). 
OS observation flights can take place 
multilaterally with the participation of 
other state parties. Such flights were regu-
larly used to monitor nuclear weapons 
infrastructure. During the flights, photo-
graphs are taken by mutual agreement thus 
providing a solid factual basis for substan-
tial dialogue. They can also be exchanged 
with third parties. Although it is not pos-
sible to determine the precise ranges of 
GLCMs with aerial photographs, they can 
confirm the existence of new weapon sys-
tems and provide data about their dimen-
sions and associated infrastructure. 
The operational ranges of ballistic mis-
siles and cruise missiles depend on a num-
ber of variables. The most important vari-
ables are the masses of the casings, of the 
control devices and engines, of the amount 
of fuel and of the warhead, but also engine 
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thrust and aerodynamic properties. As a 
result, the outer dimensions only allow 
approximations of the missiles’ probable 
ranges, if assumptions about the variables 
are correct. The INF Treaty therefore refers 
to the maximum distance the standard 
version of a missile can travel until the fuel 
has been fully consumed. 
Clarity is best achieved by exchanging 
telemetric data, demonstrating systems on-
site and observing flight tests. It would also 
have to be established whether the test is 
for systems which, although within the INF 
range, are not covered by the INF Treaty. 
For example, the Treaty permits the test-
ing of missiles or missile stages from fixed 
launch facilities over INF ranges, unless 
they are used for ground-launched INF sys-
tems. Accordingly, it would be perfectly 
in accordance with the Treaty to test sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or missile 
stages for ICBMs using fixed launchers, such 
as those at the Kapustin Jar test site. 
In return, the US, in coordination with 
Romania and in future with Poland, would 
have to allow Russian on-site inspections at 
Aegis-Ashore positions. This might convince 
Moscow that the Mk-41 launchers used 
there are technically only intended for 
the launch of defence missiles and that no 
SLCMs or GLCMs are available for them. 
This configuration of the land-based 
Mk-41 launch systems could then be 
recorded in a technical protocol. The fact 
that it is reversible would not be a funda-
mental obstacle. The New Start Treaty also 
includes technical measures that can be 
reversed but are monitored at regular on-
site inspections. 
In order for such inspections to be effec-
tive in the long term, they would have to 
take place more frequently and at short 
notice. Inspections of non-listed facilities 
would have to be based on plausible justifi-
cations and quota limits. This is to prevent 
the verification inspections being misused 
to view facilities and systems that are not 
subject to the INF Treaty. 
Multilateral verification would make the 
fact-finding more transparent and prefer-
ably involve former and potential countries 
where INF systems could be stationed. Sub-
sequent political decisions could then be 
supported by a broad base of information. 
It might be possible to modify the INF veri-
fication regime if both sides showed the 
political will to uphold the Treaty, to seek 
cooperative solutions and to refrain from 
taking irreversible steps. 
Military strategic context 
The US are attempting to substantiate their 
allegation against Moscow of breaching the 
INF Treaty by arguing that it can no longer 
be in Russia’s geostrategic interest. Coun-
tries on its southern and eastern periph-
eries have INF systems while Russia is 
banned from possessing them. On the other 
hand, it has made up for this disadvantage 
by equipping its flotilla in the Caspian Sea 
with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). 
When Russia intervened in the Syrian war 
in September 2015, it launched conven-
tional SLCMs from the Caspian Sea at tar-
gets 1,600 kilometres away. Its fleets in the 
Atlantic, Pacific and European marginal 
seas are also equipped with SLCMs. Russian 
bombers also have long-range, air-launched 
cruise missiles (ALCMs). 
The US has employed conventionally 
equipped SLCMs widely across the Middle 
East, Afghanistan and North Africa since 
the late 1990s. In April 2017 and April 
2018, US Aegis warships from the Mediter-
ranean destroyed land targets in Syria. 
France and the UK have also demonstrated 
their SLCM/ALCM capabilities in Libya and 
Syria. 
As the US, Russia and others are increas-
ingly equipping their armed forces with 
more SLCMs and ALCMs, strategic calcu-
lations have changed. They are subject 
neither to the limitations of the New Start 
Treaty nor to those of the INF Treaty, even 
though they have a range of well over 500 
km. This has relativised the strategic value 
of the ban on ground-launched INF systems. 
SLCMs and ALCMs can reach Europe, the 
Middle East and much of Asia. 
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The military added value of a ground-
launched INF variant would be difficult to 
justify. It is sometimes assumed that Rus-
sian planners see it as an additional and 
cheaper option for reliably and quickly 
eliminating further US missile defence 
positions in Europe or Asia. But this is a 
speculative assumption which presupposes 
that new GLCMs are deployed in the most 
geographically favourable areas. 
However, operationally effective Russian 
INF systems could not be deployed in secret. 
There are also no signs yet of US missile de-
fence systems being more densely deployed 
in Europe. Russia may have developed 
prototypes to respond as and when they are 
needed. 
Russian leaders fear that any expansion 
of US missile defence could undermine 
Russia’s nuclear second-strike capability in 
the long term and thus make it susceptible 
to intimidation. However, in February 2018, 
President Putin presented modern nuclear 
weapons supposedly able to penetrate or 
bypass any defensive belt and justified 
them with precisely this argument. 
Given the various uses of conventional 
cruise missiles in military conflicts, arming 
SLCMs with nuclear capability has a nega-
tive impact on crisis stability. It not only 
increases the arsenal of ‘sub-strategic’ 
nuclear deployment options, but also the 
grey area between nuclear and convention-
al deployment profiles. If a SLCM launch is 
mistakenly interpreted as a nuclear attack, 
it could have devastating consequences. 
This is because nuclear SLCMs can have 
a strategic effect as they can attack an 
enemy’s air or missile defence installations, 
command centres, infrastructure or nuclear 
weapons from positions in the European or 
Asian marginal seas. 
Despite these concerns, the decision 
made by the Trump administration in Feb-
ruary 2018 to rearm SLCMs with nuclear 
warheads will increase the US’s ‘sub-stra-
tegic’ nuclear arsenal, which is not subject 
to any arms control treaties. In doing so, 
Trump has reversed former President 
Obama’s decision in 2010 to abandon nu-
clear SLCMs designed to attack land targets 
(TLAM-N). Russia has also modernised its 
nuclear SLCMs, especially its Kalibr-type 
cruise missiles. 
The US has justified giving its SLCMs 
nuclear capability with two lines of argu-
mentation. Firstly, the ‘extended deter-
rence’ to protect allies in East Asia could 
occur from sea since stationing nuclear 
gravity bombs on land in Japan and South 
Korea would be controversial. So far, how-
ever, the ‘extended deterrence’ has been 
based on the strategic nuclear potential of 
the US. Secondly, the Trump administration 
has linked it to Russia’s violation of the INF 
Treaty and insinuates, it could reconsider 
the SLCM option should Moscow return to 
compliance. However, completely abandon-
ing nuclear SLCMs would be incompatible 
with the argument that they are needed 
as an ‘extended deterrence’ from the sea. 
A trilateral INF Treaty 
with China? 
Not to be dismissed is the geostrategic 
argument that from 1987 new nuclear 
powers with INF capabilities have emerged 
in South and East Asia and that the People’s 
Republic of China’s INF arsenal has grown. 
Of course, this arsenal is aimed at deterring 
not only Russia, but, above all, the US from 
a regional intervention. 
President Trump has, therefore, indicated 
that China must be part of a future INF 
Treaty. It remains unclear whether and 
under what conditions this approach could 
be coordinated with Russia and whether 
China would be willing to negotiate. A joint 
Russian-US attempt to multilateralise the 
INF Treaty at the United Nations failed in 
2007. Neither China, France nor the UK 
showed any interest in the proposal. 
Whether there have since been consul-
tations between Beijing and Washington 
on the INF dossier has not been made pub-
lic, but it is unlikely. On the contrary, Hua 
Chunying, spokeswoman for the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry, has reacted indignantly to 
Trump’s public statement: It was “unjusti-
fiable and unreasonable” to blame others 
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for the US unilaterally withdrawing from 
the INF Treaty. She said that China would 
not be blackmailed. Ever since the 1990s, 
the People’s Republic has held the position 
that the major nuclear powers would have 
to scale down to the same levels as the 
smaller powers before they would consider 
participating in multilateral nuclear dis-
armament treaties. 
In fact, the US and Russia have more 
than 90 percent of all nuclear weapons 
worldwide. China has around 280 to 300 
nuclear warheads, approximately 60 inter-
continental, ground-launched ballistic mis-
siles and around 1,600 ground-launched, 
short-range and medium-range missiles and 
cruise missiles, most of which are deployed 
with conventional warheads. Approximately 
90 percent of these are in the INF range. 
If a trilateral treaty were to ban land-
based INF systems, China would lose almost 
all its capacity for regional power projec-
tion with long-range stand-off weapons. 
Without it, China would not be able to 
maintain its regional strategy of sealing off 
the East and South China Seas from US 
intervention (anti-access/area denial strat-
egy). The US, on the other hand, would not 
have to give up anything because they lack 
land-based INF carriers in the region and 
could continue to rely on their global mis-
sile, air and sea superiority. 
It is therefore unlikely that China would 
cut such a ‘deal’. The alternative, to strive 
for regional ‘INF equilibrium’, would also 
be unacceptable to China. That would 
mean setting upper limits and thus allow-
ing the US to station its systems in Japan 
or South Korea. For Europe, this solution 
would be highly dangerous as it would 
allow INF deployment west of the Urals. 
The Trump administration must have 
been aware that Beijing could do nothing 
but reject such a trilateral agreement. It 
therefore seems reasonable to assume that 
Trump’s vague references to China were 
merely intended to justify his intention to 
terminate the INF Treaty. 
Deployment and alliance politics 
A new INF arms race would threaten the 
security of Europe and Asia, but not that 
of the American continent. Should the US 
seek regional INF deployment, it would 
need the consent of any potential deploy-
ment country, with the exception of Guam. 
However, it is hard to imagine Japan, 
South Korea, the Philippines or Australia 
agreeing to a deployment of land-based 
medium-range systems. Precisely the West-
ern Pacific Allies’ traditional opposition to 
land-based nuclear weapons deployment was 
the reasoning used by the Trump adminis-
tration to justify arming its see-launched 
cruise missiles (SLCMs) with nuclear capa-
bility. 
But even if any US GLCMs are (initially) 
only conventionally armed, it would not 
be in South Korea’s interest to destroy the 
recent rapprochement on the Korean pen-
insula with a new armaments spiral. Nor 
is Japan likely to be interested in bringing 
about a new period of strained relations 
with China and risking further domestic 
conflicts over deployment issues. Australia 
and the Philippines would also not be keen 
to sour their relations with China. 
As far as Europe is concerned, the US’s 
unilateral approach is at odds with recent 
alliance positions. On 7 November 2017, 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis briefed 
his NATO counterparts on the US assess-
ment of the situation, saying that the US 
wanted Russia to return to treaty compli-
ance. This was confirmed by the US State 
Department in April 2018. In response to 
Washington’s allegations against Moscow, 
the NATO Council issued a statement on 
15 December 2017 expressing concern but 
maintaining its support for the INF Treaty 
and calling on Russia to transparently and 
comprehensively dispel any doubts in a 
technical dialogue. 
As recently as July 2018, NATO states 
unanimously declared that the INF Treaty 
was fundamental to European security and 
must be preserved. At the beginning of Oc-
tober 2018, Mattis presented new findings 
to NATO defence ministers. As a result, the 
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ministers again called on Russia to comply 
with the Treaty and to clarify unresolved 
issues in a transparent manner. 
President Trump’s subsequent announce-
ment to withdraw from the INF Treaty came 
as a surprise. It appears the allies were only 
informed shortly before the announcement, 
but not consulted. Should the US intend to 
introduce new GLCMs in Europe, the allies 
would either have to opt for a deployment 
race with Russia or accept a split in the alli-
ance. A ‘coalition of the deployment will-
ing’ cannot be ruled out. 
Conclusions 
The US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Iran nuclear 
agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, JCPOA) as well as the erosion of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE Treaty) have already impacted 
heavily on the international security archi-
tecture. If the INF Treaty were to fall apart, 
another cornerstone of the European secu-
rity order and the global nuclear order 
would be destroyed. There would then be 
no legal restrictions on a regional nuclear 
arms race in Europe and East Asia. This 
carries the risk of additional destabilisation 
amid a security crisis in which mutual trust 
has fallen to its lowest level since the 1960s. 
The starting position for the soon to be 
required extension of the New Start Treaty 
would then be extremely unfavourable. 
Should it fail, from 2021, there would be 
no legal restrictions on US and Russian 
strategic nuclear weapons for the first time 
since 1972. The already weak credibility of 
the major powers in meeting disarmament 
obligations contained in the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would be further 
undermined. This would also increase pres-
sure on the NPT. Europe would be confronted 
with a new debate on closing a perceived 
gap in nuclear armaments that could lead 
to an increased nuclear threat to both sides 
from INF redeployment. None of these sce-
narios is in the interests of Germany or 
Europe. 
However, by no means have all the 
options for overcoming the INF crisis in a 
cooperative manner been exhausted. It has 
not yet been sufficiently clarified whether 
and to what extent the mutual allegations 
of breach of contract are misinterpretations 
of the source situation or different inter-
pretations of Treaty provisions, which could 
be amicably resolved through additional 
technical protocols or joint declarations. 
Only an unequivocally proven intended 
threat to Europe, such as the operational 
deployment of ground-launched INF, could 
no longer be eliminated in a cooperative 
manner, unless this decision were politically 
revised. 
Substantial joint steps would therefore 
first have to be agreed in order to preserve 
the Treaty and, if necessary, modify it. For 
example, the US and Russia could make 
a political statement on the fundamental 
value of the INF Treaty and express their 
willingness to comply with its provisions 
and to clarify unresolved issues in a co-
operative manner. 
It would then be useful to exchange, 
discuss and verify the relevant technical 
data through a combination of satellite 
monitoring, cooperative Open Skies obser-
vation flights and on-site inspections. Allies 
should be included in multilateral verifi-
cation measures in order to make follow-up 
policy decisions based on a comprehensive 
factual basis. 
The Federal Government should cam-
paign for this approach at NATO and form 
a broad coalition of like-minded states. 
They should agree on the aim of not giving 
European approval to new deployments of 
INF systems in Europe unless Russia threat-
ens European allies by stationing such sys-
tems. 
Moscow is interested in Germany and 
France cooperating with Russia in the Nor-
mandy format on conflict settlement in 
Ukraine, on the reconstruction of Syria, 
on energy transfer and in advocating the 
continuation of the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act. Russia should be made aware that this 
desired cooperation also depends on it trans-
parently complying with its obligations 
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under the INF Treaty and not threatening 
Europe with INF systems. 
The crisis should also be used as an 
opportunity to initiate a discussion in the 
Alliance on the role of nuclear weapons 
in its deterrence strategy. There must be 
no grey areas of nuclear ambiguity. These 
could, in fact, suggest nuclear warfare capa-
bility with supposedly ‘tactical’ nuclear 
weapons and lead to fatal misjudgements 
in crises. 
The number of employments of conven-
tional cruise missiles is growing and if they 
were deployed in a nuclear role, this would 
have a destabilising effect. This concern 
could be the starting point for a modified 
INF Treaty or a multilateral follow-up treaty. 
In addition, Germany should work to 
strengthen the Hague Code of Conduct 
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) 
by adding cruise missiles to it and improv-
ing its transparency rules. Germany should 
encourage a discussion at the UN Security 
Council on strengthening nuclear arms con-
trols and disarmament in order to preserve 
strategic stability and the credibility of the 
non-proliferation regime. 
Wolfgang Richter is a Senior Associate in the International Security Division at SWP. 
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